Obstruction of Justice and Threats to Personal Liberty in Ireland's High Court
Obstruction of Justice and Threats to Personal Liberty in Ireland's High Court
Introduction
Since October 2024, I have pursued legal action to address what I believe constitutes systemic obstruction of justice, irregularities in the June 2024 Westmeath Local Election, and unconstitutional conduct by judicial and public authorities in Ireland. My proceedings target alleged misconduct by the Courts Service, An Garda Síochána, a County Registrar, and the Chief State Solicitor. I contend that these actions, combined with judicial rulings, jeopardize the personal liberty protections enshrined in Article 40.4 of Bunreacht na hÉireann. This account details my efforts, substantiated by affidavits, motions, and judgments I am prepared to present.
October 2024: Ex Parte Motions and Initial High Court Orders
On October 14, 2024, I filed two ex parte motions before the High Court, recorded as H.I.A.2024.190 and H.I.A.2024.191. In affidavit H.I.A.2024.190, I alleged that members of the Courts Service and An Garda Síochána obstructed justice by impeding my attempt to file an affidavit. That affidavit, H.I.A.2024.191, accused a County Registrar and the Chief State Solicitor of serious offenses linked to an alleged cover-up of irregularities in the June 2024 Westmeath Local Election, thereby restricting my access to justice. Justice Cregan issued orders acknowledging that my claims raised issues under Article 40.4, which safeguards personal liberty. The orders—H.I.A.2024.190 concerning the Garda and Courts Service, and H.I.A.2024.191 concerning the County Registrar and Chief State Solicitor.
Subsequently, I issued two plenary summonses, docketed as 2024.6645P and 2024.6852P, to hold the defendants personally accountable. I also seek to hold the Garda Commissioner and the CEO of the Courts Service accountable through vicarious liability, as these alleged unlawful actions occurred under their oversight. I have requested a jury trial under Article 38 of the Constitution, asserting that the defendants’ alleged personal misconduct warrants individual liability.
December 2024: Judicial Rulings and Constitutional Concerns
On December 6, 2024, Justice Humphreys delivered a judgment ([2024] IEHC 690) that I contend infringed my personal liberty by permitting the Minister to invoke this jurisdiction. On December 16, 2024, I moved the High Court, arguing that the inherent jurisdiction of the court—a constitutional power—is reserved for natural persons, not statutory offices or body corporates such as the Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage. However, Humphreys refused my application for a fee exception. This judgment ([2024] IEHC 728) includes the argument put forward confirming the Minister’s status as a statutory entity. Humphreys proceeded to strike out my application for a fee exemption under Article 5(a) of Statutory Instrument 492/2014 by restricting its scope to Article 40.4.2°–4°. This decision misinterpreted the law, demonstrably limiting my access to justice and undermining my rights.
February 2025: Precedent and Intensified Efforts
On February 4, 2025, I advanced my plenary proceedings, 2024.6645P and 2024.6852P. Noting the defendants’ failure to enter an appearance, I also argued—by ex parte motion and subsequent motions on notice—that the defendants should not benefit from state-funded legal representation due to their alleged personal misconduct and criminal wrongdoing. Throughout February and March, I filed multiple ex parte motions and pursued appeals in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, targeting the Chief State Solicitor and Mason Hayes & Curran LLP, whose representation of the defendants has no lawful basis.
On February 6, 2025, Justice Cregan relied on Justice Humphreys’ ruling ([2024] IEHC 728) to deny a citizen’s personal liberty claim, as recorded in [2025] IEHC 171.
March 2025: Conflicting Rulings and State Funds Dispute
On March 10, 2025, Justice Humphreys, in [2025] IEHC 163, paragraph 4, recognized broader protections for personal liberty. Yet, he upheld his prior reasoning in [2024] IEHC 728—a stance I assert is erroneous and detrimental to constitutional rights.
On March 26, 2025, I moved the High Court in proceedings 2024.6645P and 2024.6852P to address the alleged misuse of state funds to defend individuals accused of personal misconduct. Justice Cregan adjourned these motions without a return date, mirroring the adjournment of my February 4 motions. Instead, he directed the defendants’ barristers to challenge his own October 14, 2024, order affirming my fee exemption. I contend this reflects a failure of accountability, as Justice Cregan permitted the Government—through the Office of the Attorney General—to utilize the Chief State Solicitor’s service, and allowed the Department of Justice and the Courts Service Board to fund Mason Hayes & Curran LLP to defend public servants accused of misconduct and potential criminal wrongdoing.
April and June 2025: Challenging Weak Defenses
In April 2025, the defendants submitted arguments contesting my fee exemption, relying entirely on case law unrelated to our Constitution. Their submissions were filed on 24 April 2025 and again on 28 April 2025. On June 3, 2025, I presented evidence to the High Court establishing that the defendants relied solely on misapplied case law to impose fees on my fundamental rights proceedings.
Systemic Implications: A Threat to All Citizens
I assert that the High Court, in concert with the Government, Attorney General, Department of Justice, and Courts Service Board, is attempting to narrow Article 40.4.1° through judgments such as [2024] IEHC 728, [2025] IEHC 171, and [2025] IEHC 163. This approach seeks to limit personal liberty violations to physical deprivations alone. Protection against physical liberty deprivation is already addressed by Article 40.4.2°. To interpret Article 40.4.1° as solely protecting physical liberty would render redundant the broader, citizen-specific safeguard against personal liberty deprivation without lawful authority. If successful, this interpretation could render minor offenses—those not involving physical detention but carrying custodial sentences—inconsistent with Article 40.4.1° and Article 15.4, which prohibits unconstitutional legislation. This threatens the constitutional rights of all citizens.
Pending Judgments and Next Steps
As of June 8, 2025, I await judgments in my plenary proceedings, 2024.6645P and 2024.6852P, expected within two weeks. Should Justice Cregan confine personal liberty to physical liberty, the consequences for constitutional protections will be profound, affecting not only my case but the rights of all Irish citizens. I am prepared to respond, potentially through further appeals or other actions.
Conclusion
My legal efforts, initiated with motions to expose alleged election irregularities and obstruction, seek to hold public officials accountable through plenary proceedings and a jury trial under Articles 40.4 and 38 of the Constitution. In good faith, I adhered to the High Court’s order of October 14, 2024, directing me to engage with this statutory process. However, as the High Court has already seized these issues, I reserve the right to pursue justice through its inherent jurisdiction. Supported by evidence, I challenge a system I believe undermines fundamental rights. The High Court’s forthcoming rulings will test Ireland’s commitment to justice and personal liberty.